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Abstract—The current Social Web is centralized. Large
information silos store all the users’ profiles, their social
links and much of the other personal data. In return
for the reliable service the users allow their data and
activities to be data mined by the service providers, which
in this way increase their advertising revenue. As the
social applications are storing increasingly more data and
attracting more users, many questions about privacy, data
ownership and data portability arise.
In this paper we are going to critically assess the current
state of the Social Web, identify several novel research
problems and outline the possible solution: friend-to-
friend computing (F2F). F2F is a completely decentralized
architecture in which two computers can communicate
only if their owners know one another. Constraining the
connections to friends-only solves many of the security
problems of the peer-to-peer architectures. We argue that
a reliable social application platform can be built using
F2F as the substrate. The platform gives the users much
more control over their data than the current Social Web
and ensures the level of privacy and security not possible
in any centralized architecture. Groups can easily build
their own ad-hoc networks and collaborate without the
need for any servers or third-party services.
I. INTRODUCTION
While it is still an open question whether Web 2.0 is
not the next tech bubble and whether profitable business
models can be built around it [31], the rise of Web 2.0
has brought with it several important changes. Perhaps
the biggest of them is the transformation of the Web from
a passive read-only medium to a participatory read-write
one. Users are not only consumers but also collaborating
producers of content, the prime example of which is
Wikipedia. Users also have started bringing their social
links to the Web giving rise to a new breed of the social
application. Thousands of such applications have sprung
up enabling, as Clay Shirky [29] puts it: ”ridiculously
easy group formation”. However, to be successful each
new social application must overcome the chicken-and-
egg problem. The value of the social application to its
users is the greater the more of them are using it, but
applications need the users’ social links and the users are
required to input it for each new application, which is a
slow and repetitive process. This problem has prompted
several big on-line social networks to turn themselves
into a Social Web platform [5], [9], [8]. Applications
have access to millions of users and their social links
and can rapidly expand their user bases. However, as the
applications are getting tied to the platforms and storing
more data in them, many questions about privacy, data
ownership and data portability arise. In this paper we
are going to critically assess the current state of the
Social Web, identify several novel research problems
and outline the possible solutions.
Interestingly enough, given the decentralized grass-
roots social nature of the new Web, from the systems
architectural point of view it is still a centralized client-
server. Both the social links and the social applications
are stored and run in the data centers. But is it the
best systems architecture for the Social Web? In the
recent years the peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, just like
the Web have been rapidly evolving and have become
a very efficient and robust communication and content
delivery platforms. The popularity and usability of the
P2P systems can only increase as more upload bandwidth
and other resources are available at the Internet edges
[15]. The central argument of this paper is that many
of the current problems of the Social Web can be
solved by shifting it from the data centers to the
edges of the Internet where the actual users, their
data and their social links are.
II. THE MOTIVATION & THE PROBLEMS
A. Who owns the data?
As the online social networks are becoming more
popular they accumulate more data and it is becoming
increasingly more tempting for the third parties to gain
access to it. In almost all the systems the Terms of Ser-
vice prohibit any form of automated data extraction and
the users that attempt it are quickly cut off. Several high-
profile incidents [10] have sparked the discussion on who
exactly owns the social data [13]. One camp claims that
users should be allowed to export their social links, while
the other argues that a social link is effectively owned
by two people and anything that happens to it should
be at the consent of both of the owners. Whatever the
consensus in this data ownership discussion will be, an
immediate research question arises: What technological
means can be used to control access to the social data?
B. Controlling access to the personal information space.
The Social Web stores not only the data about the
social links but also the user’s profiles, comments, mes-
sages, photos, user action history or in general any
social application state [4]. All this, forms the user’s
personal information space. The user might want to give
access to parts of this space to another user or to the
general public, while keeping the other parts strictly
private. The different parts of the personal information
space are modified by the different social applications
and some applications might like to share part of the
space with other applications [3]. The three actors: users,
applications and the online social networks hosting the
social data need to coordinate the data sharing process.
How can the personal information space be securely
shared between users and between applications? How
can we precisely define the access control rules?
C. Protecting privacy & the attention data.
When users are accessing any of the data in their per-
sonal information space, that data is hosted somewhere,
either at the servers of the social networking website or at
the servers of the social applications. The servers can log
the access to any data for any particular user. This data
is termed the attention data [1] and is typically used to
serve more accurate, targeted advertising, which makes
the data valuable to the service providers. The attention
data is extremely sensitive and any data leaks have
serious privacy implications [12], [25], [24]. However,
the user might like to have control not only over who can
access the user’s data but also control who knows about
the fact that the data was accessed. How can we prevent
the attention data leaks and privacy violations in the
Social Web?
D. Need for a Social Web platform giving users more
control.
Currently the majority of the Social Web is locked
in a few information silos, which store the social data
on behalf of the users and in return the users provide
advertising income. For this reason the social data is
valuable to companies and is not easily given away
to third parties [11]. To use the social data, the third
party applications must use the Social Web platforms
and agree to their numerous restrictions on how the
data can be used. Although most platforms offer various
user-adjustable privacy controls for each application, the
ultimate control lies in the hands of the information silo
owner. How can we transfer the full control over the
users’ data from the information silos hosting that
data to the actual users?
E. Decentralizing the Social Web.
Most of the time in social applications the users either
access their own data or the data of their social graph
neighbors. The data from the whole social graph does not
have to be aggregated and made accessible in a single
central location, on the contrary, it is very amenable to
distribution due to the localized data access patterns. It
might be feasible to completely decentralize the Social
Web and move it to the Internet edges, where the amount
of available resources has been steadily increasing over
the years [15]. What is the best architecture for the
decentralized Social Web? Is the P2P architecture
suitable?
III. THE SOLUTION: FRIEND-TO-FRIEND SYSTEMS
In this section we are going to suggest a solution to the
problem of securing and decentralizing the Social Web.
Our solution addresses the issues from the previous sec-
tion and we inevitably arrive at a new set of problems and
open questions, which in our humble opinion constitute
an interesting research agenda.
A. The social network becomes the P2P network
Let us assume that there is some social network of
people who want to start using a social application. Each
of these people has a computer with a browser and an
Internet connection. There are no servers. How can we
construct the Social Web using only this infrastructure?
The solution that we propose is the friend-to-friend
network (F2F). In an F2F network two computers can
communicate with one another only if their owners are
related in the social network. Since the two owners know
one another they can communicate either in person,
through an instant messaging service or any other means.
This side channel can be used to set up the connections
between users’ computers, i.e. by exchanging their net-
work addresses and possibly some cryptographic data
for securing the link. We claim that the F2F network
is a great substrate for building the decentralized Social
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Fig. 1. The centralized vs. the friend-to-friend Social Web. Alice wants to access her own private data and share some data with Bob.
In the centralized Social Web all the data is stored at the servers. The servers ensure high availability of the data and centrally control the
access to it. Both Alice and Bob must make network roundtrips on every data access. In the F2F Social Web the private data stays on the
Alice’s computer and Alice has full control over the access to it. Alice also controls who can access the shared data and allows only Bob
to see it. The shared data is replicated among friends for availability and durability.
Web. How can we maintain a securely interlinked
F2F network under node arrivals and departures and
under variable network addresses?
B. Social trust becomes P2P trust
One of the biggest and largely unsolved problems of
P2P systems is security [30]. Because any peer can con-
nect to any other peer this makes the systems extremely
vulnerable. Peers can arbitrarily deviate from the P2P
protocols, appear in the network under many identities
[23] or selfishly use the resources of others while not
contributing their own. Even when peer misbehavior is
detected the rogue peers need to be isolated from the
network, which is extremely hard to do without having
a stable peer identity. Open P2P systems are essentially
groups of strangers talking with each other, trust is
volatile and difficult to build.
In F2F networks the peers have a well defined identity
and the users bring the social trust into the system. A user
in the system knows that the computers that her computer
is communicating with belong to her friends and can be
trusted to work as expected. If one of the computers does
misbehave and this is detected, the users can be notified
about it and undertake the necessary action, e.g. possibly
contact the owner of the rogue computer. Strong identity
allows for self-policing and user-mediated repair in F2F
systems. How to detect peer misbehavior? How to
interact with the users after misbehavior detection?
C. F2F for data access control
One of the fundamental problems of the Social Web
that we have identified in §II is controlling access to
the data. Instead of delegating access control to the
big centralized information silos as it is done now, the
F2F system users can take access control into their
own hands (Figure 1). The computer with which the
user connects to the F2F network becomes the access
controller. Private user data stays private and never leaves
the user’s computer. The data that the user wants to
share with the selected friends can be made available
over a direct secure link to the friends’ computers. As
we mentioned in §II-E the two data access types: private
and friend-shared cover the majority of the needs of the
social applications.
F2F solves another problem with the centralized So-
cial Web, the attention data leaks. The only parities
that are aware of the data access are either the source
of the data or the receiver. Since the communication
over the F2F links is cryptographically protected, the
attention data leaks are greatly limited. Can we make
some formal statements about the potential privacy
violations in social applications? What protocols can
we use in F2F to enforce data access control and
ensure privacy?
D. F2F for data storage
The main advantages of the existing centralized Social
Web are (arguably) high availability and durability of the
stored data. The F2F platform should provide a similar
or better level of service. Just as it is done in the P2P
systems, availability and durability can be achieved by
replication [32]. The private user data can be backed up
onto her friend’s computers. The friend-shared data is by
its nature replicated to the friends that are allowed to see
it, but can also additionally be replicated to other friends.
Replication should of course guarantee confidentiality
of the replicated data and use cryptography wherever
necessary.
An interesting related problem is how to handle the
mutable replicated data. Although there are many exist-
ing solutions to this problem, most of them assume the
full n-to-n connectivity between the replicas [19] while
in F2F the replication is happening on a subgraph of
a social graph with much less than n-to-n connectivity,
which might pose serious challenges to maintaining
data consistency. In addition, in F2F there usually is a
clearly defined owner of the data, an authoritative source,
which can be leveraged when designing the replication
schemes. How can we replicate mutable data in
the social graphs? What guarantees on availability,
durability, consistency and confidentiality can we
make?
E. F2F as a social application platform
Having a securely interconnected F2F network and
a data storage layer built on the top is just a first step
towards the complete Social Web platform. As any other
platform the Social Web needs an application runtime
environment. This is probably one of the biggest open
problems. Shifting the Social Web from the servers to
the edges means that the application is distributed as
well. F2F gives the users more control over their data,
the data is less mobile. The data cannot always get to
the application code, the application code must get to
the data and be executed where the data is.
At first this might seem to be too constraining for
the applications. There are two main problems: 1) the
application cannot conceal the code execution from the
user and 2) there is no data that is completely private
to the application. These two points might be false
in the case of client-server applications, but are true
for the classical desktop applications. In that sense the
F2F runtime model would be the same as the desktop
model: applications execute outside the control of the
application creator giving the user full control over what
data is fed into the application. What is the best
application runtime model suitable for the Social Web
that does not force the users to give up control over
their data?
IV. RELATED WORK
A. Friend-to-friend systems
The concept of friend-to-friend systems is not new, the
term has been coined by Dan Bricklin [7] already back
in 2000. Since then several efforts have been made to
build F2F systems. We unfortunately do not have space
to mention all of them here but excellent introductions
[6] and surveys [28] are available. Perhaps, the most well
known system is Freenet [20] which is a distributed key-
based data storage network. It’s main design goals are
censorship resistance and anonymity. Freenet can operate
in the classical F2F (darknet) mode where the users can
only join the network when they know someone who
can let them in, but also in the opennet mode in which
anyone can join. Another, more recent effort, Friendstore
[22] looks at how to ensure availability and durability in
a social backup system.
In general, F2F systems have received relatively little
attention in the research community. Several systems
have been built by enthusiasts and private companies, but
they focus on specific applications such as file-sharing
or messaging. In contrast, in this paper we are calling for
research into F2F as a general social application platform
which is an entirely novel problem.
B. Peer-to-peer systems
When building the F2F systems we can to a large
extent rely on the results from the P2P community. The
problems of overlay routing and distributed storage have
been well understood and a multitude of systems have
been proposed [21], [26], [27], [16], some of them are
widely deployed at the edges [26]. However despite
many proposed solutions [30], [18], [17] P2P security
remains an important open problem. F2F greatly reduces
most of the P2P systems vulnerabilities by bringing the
social trust into them. This happens at a cost though.
The classical P2P systems rely on being able to connect
to any peer in the network while in F2F connections are
only possible to the friends. It is an interesting open
research question whether F2F can be turned into a
reliable routing and data storage substrate despite these
constraints.
C. Cloud computing
The dominance of the client-server architecture on
the Web has led to significant advances in virtualization
and consolidation technologies. Some companies have
accumulated large amounts of hardware in their data
centers and developed software to manage it. Amazon
started selling raw computation and storage services thus
creating a new Hardware as Service (HaaS) market [14].
The advances in the browser technology and Web 2.0
have brought applications with similar look-and-feel to
desktop applications. A trend termed Software as Service
(SaaS). These and other concepts are being thrown under
one umbrella term of cloud computing [2].
F2F is the antithesis to cloud computing, it decentral-
izes data access control and places them in the hands
of users by which it significantly improves privacy and
security. It remains to be seen, however, whether F2F
proves to be a feasible alternative to the centralized So-
cial Web. Ultimately, we envision cloud computing and
friend-to-friend computing working together to produce
the right balance between privacy, user empowerment
and the quality of service.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the seventies the dominant computing platform
were the mainframes processing batch jobs dispatched
from dumb terminals. Ten years after that the personal
computer arrived, placing computing power at the finger-
tips of the individuals, who no longer had to rely on the
mainframes. With the growth of the Web and its reliance
on the client-server architecture we are repeating the
mainframe history again. We have become too dependent
on the servers. We need to decentralize and the best place
to start this process is the Social Web. The new Social
Web operating at the edges of the Internet can potentially
be as empowering to the collaborating groups of people
as the personal computer has been to the individuals.
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